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Copyright Porn Trolls, Wasting Taxi
Medallions, and the Propriety of “Property”
Tom W. Bell*
INTRODUCTION
This Paper relates two stories with a common moral. The
first, discussed in Section I, describes how copyright porn trolls
have in effect, and to the chagrin of courts and commentators,
engaged in a massive extortion scheme. The second, discussed in
Section II, describes how beneficiaries of taxi medallions have
resorted to rioting and violence to fend off competition from new
transportation services like Uber and Lyft.
Section III sums up the moral to both stories: tragedy follows
when the law tries to protect fuzzy and ill-defended privileges
with rules better suited for protecting common law property.
With both copyright and taxi medallions, lawmakers have
created entitlements that have only some of property’s virtues,
and no good claim to its name, but powers as great or greater
than those that the common law affords to property owners. We
would have less reason to worry about mass extortion by
copyright trolls and violence by the dependents of taxi medallions
if we limited their privileges to liability remedies.
This Paper concludes that “privilege” offers a more accurate
description of copyrights and taxi medallions than “property”
does. They possess only some of the attributes of property, such
as exclusivity or alienability. Property consists of more than just
a few admirable functional features, however. It has roots in
nature, custom, and the common law. And the remedies that it
puts at the disposal of property owners prove too powerful when
invoked in the service of poorly defined and ill-defended
privileges.
We might well wonder whether lawmakers should create
copyrights and taxi medallions at all. Both rely on artificially
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imposing scarcity—barring free enjoyment of public goods in the
first place and free access to public customers in the other—a
practice that has the immediate effect of making their select
beneficiaries much better off and everybody else a little worse off.
Even if we can in theory excuse those temporary costs as a just
price for greater long term gains, such as stimulating the
creation of original expressive works and preventing failure in
the market for personal transportation services, in practice
things do not always work out so nicely. The combination of
concentrated benefits, diffuse costs, and unchecked political
power invites a public choice disaster, wherein a privileged few
successfully lobby for greater power and wealth, leaving the rest
of us with less of both.1
Those represent valid concerns about copyrights and taxi
medallions, but they are not ones pressed by this Paper. Here, it
suffices to observe that woe follows when the law endows
statutory privileges with powers equal to or greater than those
that protect property, and to counsel less coercive remedies as a
cure. That would not only generate welcome policy effects but
also help safeguard the propriety of “property.”
I. COPYRIGHT PORN TROLLS
Copyright plaintiffs’ attorneys across the United States have,
of late, made a business out of accusing thousands of John Does
at a time with having infringed their clients’ pornographic films
via public file sharing services.2 These suits apparently aim at
little more than winning subpoenas to uncover the identities of
the defendants, whom the plaintiffs then threaten with the
Copyright Act’s extraordinary remedies and public disclosure of
the suspected porn use. These hardball tactics have netted
millions in settlement payments from guilty and innocent alike—
and attracted sharp criticism. Judges and commentators alike
have described the phenomenon as little better than mass
extortion. This Section reveals the dirty tricks played by Internet
porn trolls and blames their success on the notion that copyright
deserves not just the same protections afforded to common law
property but even greater ones.
1 For evidence of that effect, see Emily Badger, The Taxi Industry Is Crushing Uber
and Lyft on the Lobbying Front, 3,500 to 1, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 31, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/31/the-taxi-industry-is-crushi
ng-uber-and-lyft-on-the-lobbying-front-3500-to-1/.
2 See generally Christopher Civil, Mass Copyright Infringement Litigation: Of
Trolls, Pornography, Settlement and Joinder, 30 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2 (2014);
Amy Rosen, The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming: An Analysis of Extortive Pornographic
“Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventive Approaches, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 165
(2013).
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The last decade has seen an astonishing increase in
copyright lawsuits, filed against thousands of John Doe
defendants at a time, accusing all of taking part in the illegal
sharing of pornographic files. These lawsuits, which bear all the
marks of trolling expeditions, have become the most common
form of copyright litigation in several U.S. districts.3 In some,
they represent more than half of all new cases filed.4
How do these cases arise? Typically, a small firm that
represents producers holding copyrights in pornographic films
examines traffic on BitTorrent, an open source file-sharing
network, to see if it can identify unauthorized copying and
distribution of the copyrighted works. If successful, this
monitoring generates lists of thousands of suspect Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses.5 The firm then seeks to convince a court
to permit joinder of all the defendants in a single suit—an effort
that, if not always successful, succeeds often enough to make
these massive lawsuits profitable. If it can surmount that hurdle,
the plaintiff law firm then uses court-ordered discovery to force
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to reveal the persons behind
the IP addresses.6
Once it has the names and contact information for thousands
of defendants in hand, the copyright porn troll can begin reaping
settlement payments of a few thousand dollars from each. The
troll reminds reluctant defendants that litigation will reveal
their alleged porn viewing habits to the public and, more
relevantly for present purposes, expose them to the prospect of
up to $150,000 in statutory damages for each infringed work.7
The result: easy money from cowed defendants, innocent and
guilty alike.
Perhaps due to the vast amount of fast money to be made,
copyright porn trolls have hardly covered themselves in honor.
Their practices have won judicial rebuke and sanctions. Judge
Otis D. Wright of the U.S. Central District of California described
one such lawsuit pending before him as “essentially an extortion
scheme.”8 Another firm participating in the practice has faced

3 Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105,
1107 (2015).
4 Id. at 1108.
5 Note that IP here stands for “Internet Protocol” and not “Intellectual Property.”
6 See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(compelling disclosure of Does’ identities by third-party ISPs).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
8 Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–10, No. 2:12-CV-3623-ODW, 2012 WL 5382304,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012).

Do Not Delete

802

5/22/2015 7:08 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

claims of identity theft and manufacturing litigation.9 A class
action lawsuit was recently filed charging the plaintiff
pornographers with racketeering, fraud, defamation, and other
charges, all arising out of their association with litigation trolling
strategies.10 Perhaps most of the blame for these infelicities
should fall on the characters involved and the lure of easy money.
Nonetheless, it seems as if a certain moral stink pervades the
whole business of copyright porn litigation.
The common law would never support anything akin to this
sort of mass extortion. That copyright has encouraged porn trolls
to adopt such tactics suggests that its privileges not only match
the legal potency of property rights but exceed it. And, indeed,
porn trolls’ suits rely crucially on special provisions of the
Copyright Act to win access to legal remedies unknown in the
common law. A fellow could write an entire book about the
virtues of conceiving copyright as a form of statutory privilege
rather than as a form of property.11 Suffice it here to say that the
lawsuits brought by copyright porn trolls show all too clearly the
woes that follow when statutory privileges acquire powers not
just equal to those of property, but greater than them.
But the problem is not simply that copyright has arrogated
unto itself coercive powers even greater than those afforded to
owners of private property. If copyrights functioned with the
same efficiency as tangible property—if copyright transactions
had low costs, in other words—it might not be such a bad idea to
extend to copyrights the protections given to property. In
actuality, transactions in copyrights impose notoriously high
costs. The problems start with the occasional but typically thorny
difficulties of establishing who has good title to a given work.
They continue into questions about the fuzzy border between
copying and fair use.
Most notably for present purposes, transactions in Internet
porn copyrights evidently impose considerable enforcement costs.
It proves difficult for copyright holders to protect their works via
self-help measures, to detect when infringement happens, and to
obtain service over the responsible parties. Whether we rue that
situation or not, the economic fact remains: transactions in

9 See Andrea Peterson & Timothy B. Lee, Firm Accused of Uploading Porn, Shaking
Down People Who Download It, WASH. POST SWITCH BLOG (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/16/firm-accused-of-uploadin
g-porn-shaking-down-people-who-download-it/.
10 See David Kravets, Porn Studios Accused of Screwing Their Fans in BitTorrent
Lawsuits, WIRED (July 9, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/07/porn-studios-screw-fans/.
11 See TOM W. BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE: COPYRIGHT, COMMON LAW, AND THE
COMMON GOOD (2014).
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Internet porn copyrights do not possess the same relatively low
costs that characterize traditional forms of property. As Section
III discusses below, that fact has ramifications for the efficiency
of protecting copyrights with property remedies (or, as we might
say in copyright’s case, property-plus remedies). First, though,
the next Section will find similar attributes in taxi medallions.
II. WASTING TAXI MEDALLIONS
The privilege that cities grant to taxis—the exclusive right to
serve passengers flagging down rides—has come under pressure
from Uber, Lyft, and other networked transportation services.
This fresh competition has driven down the value of taxi
medallions, causing their holders to complain of theft by private
parties and takings by public ones. Such claims look unlikely to
move courts, however, which typically treat taxi medallions not
as types of property but as government-granted privileges
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.12
Frustrated by the dissipation of their rents, taxi drivers and
medallion holders have resorted to blocking traffic and physically
assaulting their new competitors. That speaks less to the
injustice of denying them legal relief, however, than it does to the
inefficiencies of granting taxi services transferable and exclusive
rights to serve a particular segment of the transportation
market. Treating taxi medallions like property has fostered an
undue sense of entitlement, exacerbating conflict and
discouraging innovation. This Section discusses the problem and
what to do about it.
Of what use is a taxi medallion? Generally speaking, it
affords a legal entitlement, exclusive but enjoyed collectively by
all licensed taxis within a given municipality, to transport on
public streets passengers who have been solicited on those
streets.13 Outside of that privilege fall for-hire vehicles, which
cannot legally solicit paying passengers on public streets but
must instead pick up only those who have arranged ahead of
time for a ride.14 The distinction between customers who flag
down rides on city streets and customers who otherwise arrange
for transport has long protected limos and other private car
12 Note that this Paper uses “privilege” solely as a legal term of art and not to
describe the social effects of phenomena like racism or sexism.
13 See People v. Ethridge, 215 N.Y.S.2d 664, 667–68 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1961)
(holding that a vehicle not responding to street hails, but rather operating solely in
response to previous arrangement, need not be licensed as a taxi). Cf. People v. Betzig, 79
N.E.2d 747 (N.Y. 1948) (finding evidence of cars on private property with “taxi” signs in
their windows sufficient to support a conviction for operating a taxicab for hire).
14 Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 134 (2013).
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services from taxi licensing requirements.15 Uber, Lyft, and
similar networked services argue that they enjoy the same
loophole. On that point, however, opinions differ—and blood has
flowed.16
Functionally speaking, Uber, Lyft, SideCar, Hailo, and
similar services work like taxis hailed not by hand but by
smartphone app. They allow passengers with Internet access to
connect with independent contractors willing and able to provide
private car services. These companies do not themselves own or
operate vehicles; they instead run markets for personal
transportation and make money from charging commissions on
sales.17
Lyft’s general counsel, Kristin Svercheck, has described the
company as little more than an Internet site. “What we’re really
doing is acting as an intermediary, allowing two individuals to
connect,” she explained.18 She insists on that characterization to
support her claim that Lyft enjoys the shelter of section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, a 1996 law passed to protect
websites from bogus defamation claims, but written in terms so
broad that it protects many other kinds of intermediary
services.19 Her theory has yet to receive judicial scrutiny; there
has of yet been no court opinion directly relating to ride-sharing
apps.
Regardless of whether that particular defense ends up
benefitting Lyft and other networked transportation companies,
they enjoy other advantages over taxis and similarly regulated
services. One of the biggest: simply avoiding the hassles and
expenses of the regulations themselves. The typical taxi sports
dozens of mandatory signs and stickers, purchased from the
licensing authority—to say nothing of the medallion itself—
attached to the vehicle via holes punched through its sheet
metal.20
Unless and until local authorities force them to comply with
the same regulations applicable to taxis, moreover, networked
15 See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 103 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Ct. Spec. Sess. App. Part 1951),
aff’d, 103 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1952).
16 See, e.g., Carol Matlack, Paris Cabbies Slash Tires, Smash Windshields in Protest
Against Uber, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.business
week.com/articles/2014-01-13/paris-cabbies-slash-tires-smash-windshields-in-protest-agai
nst-uber (reporting on injuries resulting from attack of Paris cabbies on Uber vehicles).
17 Stephanie Francis Ward, ‘App’ Me a Ride: Internet Car Companies Offer
Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13, 13.
18 Id. at 17.
19 Id. at 14; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
20 Emily Badger, Is This Worth $350,000? No One Knows, WASH. POST, June 22,
2014, at G1.
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transportation companies do not have to buy insurance for their
drivers (who instead provide their own), run background checks
on them (though they often do so voluntarily), use only drivers
that have commercial licenses, or submit their vehicles to special
inspection.21 Beneficiaries of the taxi privilege have fought back,
lobbying to have the same regulations which burden them
imposed on their new competitors.22 “We are not afraid of
competition, but we want fair competition,” explained Joel Wood,
a Teamsters organizer advocating on behalf of taxi drivers in the
D.C. area.23
In
some
markets,
competition
from
networked
transportation services has evidently driven down the value of
taxi medallions.24 Even in municipalities that have not seen
medallion values slip, people who work in the taxi industry feel
threatened by the loss of paying customers. Drivers feel “a lot of
vulnerability and anger” about the issue, explained Bhairavi
Desai, executive director of the National Taxi Workers Alliance, a
group recently created to respond to the new competitive
threat.25 “We have always had illegal pickups and it’s always
been an economic issue for drivers, especially in times of
recession,
but
now
multibillion-dollar
companies
are
orchestrating these illegal pickups.”26
Those threatened by changes to the taxi status quo feel so
much anxiety and frustration that they have resorted to civil
disobedience. Taxi drivers in London, Paris, and other cities
protested the advent of new competition by parking in public
streets, blocking traffic.27 Their strong feelings have
unfortunately boiled over into violence, resulting in slashed tires,
smashed windows, and physical injuries.28
Why have those who work in the taxi industry responded so
strongly to the advent of networked transportation services?
Perhaps because the rhetoric of property, misapplied to taxi
medallions, has given them an inflated sense of entitlement.
Opponents of networked transportation services thus accuse

Luz Lazo, Taxicab Interests Unite to Fight, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2014, at B1.
Id.
Id.
Badger, supra note 20.
Lazo, supra note 21.
26 Id.
27 Mark Scott, Traffic Snarls in Europe as Taxi Drivers Protest Against Uber, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (June 11, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/taxi-protestsagainst-uber-in-europe-to-snarl-traffic; Taxi Drivers Across Europe Protest Against Uber
App – In Pictures, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/
gallery/2014/jun/11/taxi-drivers-across-europe-protest-uber-app-in-pictures.
28 Matlack, supra note 16.
21
22
23
24
25
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them of “stealing work” from licensed drivers—as if paying
customers could be owned.29
We see the same mindset at work in legal arguments, made
by the holders of taxi medallions, that if a city were to reform its
transportation policies to allow more competition to the
detriment of established services, it would thereby take the
private property embodied in the medallions and owe just
compensation for doing so.30 Research into the market price of
taxi medallions, which indicates that their present values do not
reflect expectations of continued rents, makes that claim look
economically dubious.31 Research into the applicable legal
precedents makes it look utterly hopeless.32 Just as it seems to
encourage violence in the street, however, calling taxi medallions
“property” seems to encourage outlandish arguments.
Bombastic rhetoric aside, taxi medallions do not constitute
property except in a strained sense of the word. Unlike any
traditional kind of property, taxi medallions do not exist in a
state of nature, by custom, or at the common law; they arise
solely by legislative fiat.33 Though the right of exclusive use has
been described as the foremost attribute of property,34 the rights
secured by a taxi medallion belong not to any particular
individual but only collectively—by all those licensed to serve

29 Lazo, supra note 21 (quoting Joel Wood, a Teamsters organizer advocating on
behalf of taxi drivers).
30 Badger, supra note 20 (discussing arguments of Michael Shakman and Edward
Feldman, Chicago attorneys suing the city on behalf of investors and companies that rely
on taxi medallions).
31 See Peter Van Doren, Should Taxi Medallion Owners Be Compensated?, CATO
INST. CATO AT LIBERTY (June 23, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/should-taximedallion-owners-be-compensated.
32 Steve Oxenhandler, Comment, Taxicab Licenses: In Search of a Fifth Amendment,
Compensable Property Interest, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 113 (2000) (surveying the law to conclude
that taxi medallion reform can give rise to valid takings claims only if the government
expressly creates a compensable property interest or requires the holder to divest all
interests in the license without surrendering it to the government, and that only
abolishing the excludability or alienability of the medallion rises to the level of a taking).
33 To statist legal positivists, who care more about practical effects than origins or
moral legitimacies, those deficiencies hardly disqualify taxi medallions as property;
indeed, the seminal article in that line of thinking expressly includes taxi medallions as a
form of legal entitlement meriting the label “property.” See Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (1964). As the discussion immediately below indicates,
however, courts have not followed scholars in that characterization.
34 See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to
exclude others.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 731 (1998) (explaining the right to exclude as “a necessary and sufficient condition of
identifying the existence of property”). But see Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003) (criticizing the view that exclusion is
the sine qua non of property and arguing for also defining property in terms of
acquisition, use, and disposal).
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passengers flagging down paid transport on public streets.35
Whereas property traditionally enjoys free alienability, taxi
medallions cannot be transferred without the supervision and
approval of licensing authorities.36
From observations such as these, some authority has it that
taxi medallions simply do not qualify as property. As
O’Connor v. Superior Court put it, “A license or permit to engage
in the taxicab business, issued by the city pursuant to its police
power, does not convey a vested property right.”37 Other
authority, following the lead of the Supreme Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly, which held that welfare recipients facing
termination of their benefits enjoyed certain due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment,38 has afforded taxi medallions
property-like protections in certain situations. Flower Cab
Co. v. Petitte held that where a municipal ordinance gave each
taxi license holder exclusive possession of the license, the right to
assign it with few qualifications, and automatic renewal absent
revocation or suspension, the license qualified for protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that the
municipality could not unilaterally impose a moratorium on taxi
license transfers.39 That probably speaks less to whether taxi
medallions qualify as property as a theoretical matter, though,
than it does to whether government agencies simply have to
follow through on their promises.
At all events, authorities agree that municipalities have very
broad discretion to grant or refuse taxi licenses.40 As the court in
Yellow Cab Co. v. Ingalls put it, “A license, permit, or certificate
of public convenience and necessity to operate motor vehicles on
the public streets of a municipality for the conduct of a strictly
private business is not an inherent right but is a mere
privilege.”41 Furthermore, “the vast majority of states do not
35 At present, for instance, New York City licenses 13,237 taxis. Wyman, supra note
14, at 131.
36 Travel House of Buffalo, Inc. v. Grzechowiak, 296 N.Y.S.2d 689, 697 (App. Div.
1968) (holding that unauthorized transferees of taxi medallions were not entitled to
renewal of licenses), aff’d, 250 N.E.2d 355 (N.Y. 1969); Vill. Taxi Corp. v. Beltre, 933
N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 2011) (rendering illegal and unenforceable an agreement allowing
for the conveyance of a taxicab license without involvement of municipal authorities).
37 O’Connor v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (Ct. App. 1979).
38 397 U.S. 254, 261–63 (1970); see also Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985)
(stating in dictum that hearings determining an individual’s continued eligibility for food
stamps must satisfy due process); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578
(1972) (conjecturing that an employee of a public university could have a “property”
interest in his employment sufficient to give him due process rights).
39 658 F. Supp. 1170, 1175, 1180 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
40 9A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26:177 (3d ed.
rev. 2007 & Supp. 2014).
41 104 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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consider a taxicab license a Fifth Amendment, compensable
property interest.”42 More specifically, taxi medallion holders
have no property claim to the gains they enjoy thanks to
regulatory barriers on competition, leaving cities free to raise
caps on the number of licensed taxis—even if doing so causes the
market value of taxi medallions to crash.43
More than a form of property, taxi medallions resemble
government-granted privileges. This does not strip them of all
legal standing, of course. When Goldberg v. Kelly held that
beneficiaries of public welfare may enjoy Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights, such as the right to a pre-termination
hearing, the Court did not do so because it equated welfare
benefits to property.44 Charles A. Reich, whose scholarship the
Court cited, did not even call them a kind of “new property”
(a name that Reich popularized for various government
entitlements). Rather, the Court went only so far as to observe,
“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more
like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”45
The Court’s observation, while true, invites the conclusion
that “property” and “gratuity” exhaust the options. Not so.
Restricting us to those two choices alone would constitute the
fallacy of the excluded middle. In fact, the Court’s analysis leaves
room for a third category of legal entitlement: privilege. This
middle option describes welfare benefits better than either
“property” or “gratuity” does. This, the Goldberg Court itself
recognized when it retorted, “The constitutional challenge cannot
be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are
‘a “privilege” and not a “right.”’”46 As the Court implied, to call
them privileges only begins the analysis.
Goldberg completed the analysis by holding that welfare
benefits may enjoy some of the same protections—those relating
to due process—that the Fourteenth Amendment bestows on
property, proper. Though the Court in Goldberg could have made
more clear what kind of entitlement it had in mind, it still
deserves credit for developing the jurisprudence of privileges.
How appropriate, too, that it did so while interpreting the scope

Oxenhandler, supra note 32, at 132.
See Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 509
(8th Cir. 2009).
44 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
45 Id. at 262 n.8.
46 Id. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
42
43
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, which itself speaks of
“privileges.”47
More relevantly for present purposes, taxi medallions fall
short of property not merely as a matter of legal doctrine but of
actual practice. The problem arises from the imperfect
enforcement of medallion holders’ supposedly exclusive (albeit
collectively shared) right to pick up passengers hailing rides on
city streets. It has long been the case that, whether for want of
ability or will, municipal authorities fail to stop a great many
unlicensed taxi rides. For instance, so-called “gypsy cabs” began
appearing on the streets of New York City in the early 1960s,
when the supply of taxi medallions began to fall behind market
demand.48 Today, in upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs of
New York City, for-hire vehicles illegally pick up an estimated
100,000 street-hail passengers per day.49
Even absent Lyft and other networked ride sharing services,
the holders of taxi medallions would suffer a great deal of
trespass on their privileges. The advent of new competitors
merely worsens the difficulties of policing the borders of the taxi
privilege. As the next section discusses, that makes taxi
medallions poor candidates for the power of property’s remedies.
III. THE PROPRIETY OF “PROPERTY”
What do extortionate porn trolls and rioting taxi drivers
share in common? At root, they both arise from the same basic
problem: legal entitlements with very high enforcement costs.
Those enforcement costs constitute a species of transaction costs.
Like other transaction costs, they make it difficult for contesting
parties to negotiate voluntary transfers of the entitlements in
question—to license porn downloads or lease taxi medallions, for
instance. Standard economic theory suggests that we should
therefore enforce these entitlements not with a property rule but
with, at most, a liability one. This Section explains.
Both those who hold copyrights in pornographic films and
those who hold taxi medallions find it very expensive to enforce
their legal entitlements. They typically find it difficult to discover
when transgressions of their entitlements occur in the first
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). Note, however, that
whereas “privilege” appears in the first clause, the Goldberg Court’s analysis focused on
the second.
48 See Wyman, supra note 14, at 171.
49 Id. at 134.
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instance. And even when decreasing revenues make it evident
that many such transgressions must have occurred, they find it
difficult to identify the responsible parties. Even once having
caught and identified a responsible party, the privilege holders
find it expensive to enforce their entitlements.
In the particular case of Internet porn, those who hold
copyrights find it very costly, if not impossible, to identify exactly
who has infringed their works. They must therefore resort to
legally and ethically dubious mass joinder lawsuits against
unidentified John Does, described above, or learn to live with
Internet infringers. Stopping even known infringers is not,
moreover, technically easy. Given the small prospect they have of
catching repeat offenders, copyright porn trolls have to resort to
dire threats of statutory damages and the prospect of public
embarrassment if they want to get any traction in the effort to
end infringement. There is no self-help remedy akin to the fences
and locks that owners of tangible property employ as their first
and typically sufficient line of defense.
The shame suffered by those accused by copyright porn trolls
represents yet another kind of transaction cost. To the extent
that consumers do not want to be associated with buying or
licensing the use of a pornographic work, legal exchanges grow
more and more costly. At some limit, for some consumers, shame
can render transaction costs infinite. It all adds up to yet another
reason to question the propriety of claiming that copyright porn
trolls act in defense of property rights.
Those who hold, or directly benefit from, taxi medallions face
not only high enforcement costs but also the discouraging effects
that result from their collective enjoyment of the exclusive right
to convey taxi passengers. The long history of unlicensed taxis
demonstrates that they are not easy to catch in any event. The
advent of networked transport services makes it even more
difficult to identify when a passenger has hailed a ride and, if so,
whether a taxi should have done the job. And as with copyright,
there are no effective self-help remedies. The spasms of violence
exhibited by frustrated taxi drivers against their new
competitors reflect not a reasoned long-term strategy for
defending their privileges but a mere atavistic release.
On top of those problems, individual medallion holders or
drivers have only diluted incentives to enforce their
industry-wide privilege, since the benefits of the effort largely
accrue to other parties. Despite rioting and attacks on
competitors’ vehicles, the taxi industry thus largely relies on
public officials to police the boundaries of the taxi medallion’s
exclusive market. But this mechanism suffers its own incentive
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problem—one that results from the agent-principal relationship
existing between law enforcement officers and the taxi medallion
holders they defend.50 And, of course, law enforcement officers
find it difficult to catch unlicensed taxi services even when they
feel sufficiently motivated to try.
Yet another kind of transaction cost, one deeply rooted in
human psychology and particularly associated with property
claims, also deserves mention: the endowment effect.51 Because it
causes those who think they own something to systematically
overvalue it, the endowment effect threatens to raise transaction
costs in goods—such as copyrights or taxi medallions—that the
law imbues with property-like attributes. Far from a mere
theoretical concern, this effect has been observed in the
laboratory under controlled conditions.52 We should thus expect
that the more someone holding a copyright or taxi medallion
regards it as a vested property right rather than as a contingent
privilege, the endowment effect will skew their assessment of its
value and raise the costs of transacting with them.
Scholars of law and economics have long observed that when
high transaction costs inhibit voluntary transactions, property
rules offer a less efficient mechanism for allocating rights to an
entitlement than liability rules do.53 The law thus ordinarily
empowers property owners to enforce their rights through
injunctive relief while limiting the victims of negligence—who
cannot very well know beforehand with whom they should
bargain—to damages. The high transaction costs associated with
the enforcement of Internet porn copyrights and taxi medallions
suggests the wisdom of adopting a similar policy. We should in
other words stop treating those copyrights as worthy of the same
protections afforded to property rights and instead remedy them
only by payment of damages.54
In the case of copyright, the problem goes beyond a privilege
endowed with legal remedies equal to those protecting property.
50 See generally Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,
8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203, 205–06 (2005) (defining the “canonical” principal-agent model
economists have developed).
51 See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194–97 (1991), available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/
pdfplus/10.1257/jep.5.1.193.
52 See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010).
53 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
54 Other scholars have already suggested this approach to intellectual property,
albeit for reasons grounded not in economic efficiency but in the First Amendment. See
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
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After all, it would not prove so troubling if copyright porn trolls
sought only injunctions against infringement. Rather, the
problem comes from copyright holders invoking powers even
greater than those that the common law affords property owners.
As detailed above, copyright porn trolls need not show that the
defendants they accuse of infringement have inflicted any
damages or reaped any unjust profits. Rather, the availability of
statutory damages allows copyright porn trolls to go straight to
threatening with liability of up to $150,000 for each work
allegedly infringed.55 A sum that large—or even one considerably
smaller—would represent hundreds of times more than the
actual losses suffered by the copyright holder.
Some scholars have argued that so extreme a result violates
the Eighth Amendment’s edict against excessive fines.56 Courts
have not smiled on such arguments, however, reasoning that the
fines referenced in the Eighth Amendment must go to
government coffers, whereas statutory damages go to private
ones.57 Regardless, it remains indisputable that statutory
damages far exceed even the most generous monetary relief that
the common law affords to property owners. Here, copyright not
only pretends to the status of property—it exceeds it.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF PRIVILEGES
Copyright porn trolls and wasting taxi medallions alike
demonstrate how public policy can suffer when statutory
privileges pretend to the status of property rights: mass extortion
and violence in streets. At root, these problems arise because
both Internet porn copyrights and taxi medallions suffer from
very high enforcement costs. This makes them poor candidates
for the title of “property.” We would do better to recognize them
as statutory privileges.
What follows from recognizing copyrights and taxi
medallions as statutory privileges? It means we should not
safeguard them with remedies as powerful as those that protect
traditional forms of property. Goldberg teaches that statutory
privileges merit only due process protections under the
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
See, e.g., Stephan Kinsella, Copyright Censorship Versus Free Speech and Human
Rights; Excessive Fines and the Eighth Amendment, CENTER FOR STUDY INNOVATIVE
FREEDOM (Sept. 6, 2011), http://c4sif.org/2011/09/copyright-censorship-versus-free-speechand-human-rights-excessive-fines-and-the-eighth-amendment/.
57 See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586 (6th
Cir. 2007); see also Jeffrey Stavroff, Comment, Damages in Dissonance: The “Shocking”
Penalty for Illegal Music File-Sharing, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 686–87 (2011) (reviewing
case law).
55
56
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Fourteenth Amendment—not the full panoply of rights that
common law property enjoys in the Fourteenth Amendment and
elsewhere in the Constitution. Sound economic theory suggests
that indefensible and ill-defined privileges, such as copyrights in
Internet porn and the taxi medallions facing networked
competition, deserve neither injunctive remedies better suited for
protecting property nor statutory damages far in excess of those
that the common law would allow.
More than just those particular answers to the question of
what to do about copyright porn trolls and wasting taxi
medallions, this Paper has sought to contribute to the
jurisprudence of privilege. Courts and commentators too often
categorize statutory entitlements like copyrights and taxi
medallions as “property,” apparently convinced by features such
as exclusivity and transferability, undaunted by the absence of
any pedigree from natural rights or the common law, and unable
to think of any more fitting label. It proves especially puzzling
and distressing that self-avowed friends of property, such as
some conservatives, classical liberals, and libertarians, would
abuse the good name of property in such a fashion. They should
instead safeguard “property” against the confusion that will
follow if it comes to refer not to a traditional, natural, common
law right but to a bestiary of modern, artificial, statutory
privileges, such as welfare benefits, farm subsidies, copyrights,
and taxi medallions.
In calling for further development of the jurisprudence of
privilege, this Paper proposes not something totally unknown,
but something too often forgotten. As Adam Mossoff has ably
documented, the law contained “omnipresent references to
patents as privileges in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.”58 We could use more of that sort of talk today.
Patents, copyrights, and other types of IP too often get classified
as, well, intellectual property. We must speak clearly about these
complicated and abstract matters if we want to think clearly
about them. Good jurisprudence demands nothing less. On this
point, we could learn something from our predecessors.
In the long term, we should aim for courts and commentators
to appreciate that sometimes “privilege” offers a better
description of many legal entitlements than “property” does. The
latter term has been overextended to subjects that possess only
some of the attributes of property, such as exclusivity or
58 Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 969
(2007).
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alienability. Property consists of more than just a few functional
features, however. It will always have roots in nature, custom,
and the common law that statutory privileges, whatever their
merits, of necessity lack. And in particular instances, as this
Paper has documented with regard to copyright porn trolls and
wasting taxi medallions, the remedies enjoyed by property
owners will prove too powerful if put in the service of poorly
defined and poorly defended privileges.

